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MARBURY, McCULLOCH, GORE AND
BUSH: A COMMENT ON SYLVIA SNOWISS
STEPHEN B. PRESSER*

Professor Snowiss' paper is a dazzling performance, and
uniquely appropriate for this kind of a gathering, a symposium in
honor of John Marshall. She uses Marshall as a starting point,
and ends up talking about grand constitutional themes.
I do not know if I really disagree with any of Professor
Snowiss' doctrinal analysis, or her exquisitely careful historical
research, but I do dissent from her conclusions, and from her
understanding of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence.
There was a familiar ring to this paper, which at first I had a hard
time precisely discerning. The more I read, though, the more it
became clear that Professor Snowiss was doing an interesting riff
on early legal realism-her paper was a lot like Holmes' Common
Law' or Jerome Frank's Law and the Modern Mind.' Just like
theirs, her point was, if I may put words in her mouth: "Let's be
serious-Our Constitutional adjudicators have discretion, they've
nearly always had it, and it's always going to be there. They
ought to wake up to that fact, stop pretending that they are
fettered by original understanding, and get on with the business of
legislating."
Perhaps I'm alone among modern law professors, but that
still makes me nervous. Call me old-fashioned, but I still believe
that judges are supposed to judge and legislators are supposed to
be the ones doing the legislating. The notion of keeping the two
separate is what we mean by the Rule of Law, I thought. But did
John Marshall believe in the Rule of Law? Was he a judicial
legislator? I suspect he would say he was not, and would not make
the kind of extravagant claims for Marbury' that we now make.
For most of us, constitutional law begins with Marbury, and
Marshall gets the credit for inventing judicial review.
To
Professor Snowiss' credit, she understands that this is not true,
* Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History, Northwestern
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1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
2. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).

3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 37 (1803).
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and although she nods in the direction of The FederalistNo. 78,
she appears to think the real credit belongs elsewhere, maybe to
Iredell writing in 1786, or Wilson's Law Lectures, or to the early
Virginia cases.4 I think the origin goes back a bit before.
We can find, for example, in 1768, Thomas Hutchinson
writing his Dialogue between Europe and America, and having
America claim that "Judges... should decide not to enforce
immoral laws or laws contrary to the purposes of government .
In short, you do not even need a written Constitution to do
judicial review, though a writing makes it easier, and solves the
problem of the uncertainty of what laws are contrary to the
purposes of government.
In any event, the remarkable thing for me about Marbury is
not the assertion of judicial power to nullify an Act of Congress. It
is the Court's refusal to do it, and to let Jeffersonian misconduct go
unpunished. This is not constitutional law-making, at best it's
prudence, at worst cowardice. Chase had urged Marshall to join
him in declaring the 1802 Judiciary Act unconstitutional,6 but
Marshall ducked that,7 and Marbury was a weak slap on the wrist
to Marshall's cousin Jefferson, very little more.8 Indeed, three
years earlier, in Richmond, while Marshall was in the audience,
possibly absorbing Chase's pronouncements for later use,9 Chase,
in the Callender case," laid out almost the precise words
describing judicial review, grounded in Article III, that Marshall
would later use in Marbury. Chase gets none of the credit for our
institution of judicial review, and indeed, he probably deserves
4. Sylvia Snowiss, Text and Principle in John Marshall's Constitutional
Law: The Cases of Marbury and McCulloch, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 973

(2000).
5. THOMAS HUTCHINSON, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA
(1768); STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 91 (3d ed. 1995) (excerpting from BERNARD BAILYN,

THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS HUTCHINSON (1974)).

Hutchinson's AMERICA is

using arguments of a kind employed by James Otis, Jr., in the Writs of
Assistance case, when he misread Coke's opinion in Doctor Bonham's case

(1610) as a sort of precursor of American-style judicial review. See generally
PRESSER AND ZAINALDIN, supra, at 66-68.
6. See, e.g. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING:
THE ENGLISH, THE AMERICANS, AND THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST
JURISPRUDENCE 162-163 (1991) (discussing Chase's correspondence with

Marshall, where Chase urged the Chief Justice to declare the 1802 Judiciary
Act unconstitutional).
7. See, e.g. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 308-09 (1803)

(upholding the 1802 Judiciary Act on narrow technical grounds).
8. See PRESSER, supra note 6, at 163 and 243 n.51 (suggesting a federal
common law basis for granting the relief sought by Marbury).
9. 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 39 (1919)

(telling the story of Marshall's possible use of Chase's arguments).
10. United States v. Callender, 25 Fed. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va., 1800) (No.
14,709).

20001

Marbury, McCulloch, Gore and Bush

1159

none, because, as Professor Snowiss acknowledges," Paterson had
made the same point, and I dare say many of the other preMarshall Justices had as well.
Now what about McCulloch?" I recently put a constitutional
law casebook together with Doug Kmiec," and had the occasion to
re-read McCulloch for the first time in many years, and I have to
tell you, I was shocked. I find it difficult to understand the limits
of the power it gives to the federal legislature, and my first
reaction is to concede that Professor Snowiss is correct, that
McCulloch is up to something different from Marbury, and is a
sort of license for judicial law-making. But would Marshall have
believed that? I suspect Marshall knew that he was out on a limb,
because the question of Congress's having the general power of
incorporation had come up in the Philadelphia Convention, as well
as the question of incorporation of a national bank, and neither
power had been explicitly granted.'4 But Hamilton thought we
needed a national bank, and he and Marshall found the
justification in the Necessary and Proper Clause. Maybe a
national bank really was "necessary" if we were going to be a
viable commercial republic, and maybe if the Necessary and
Proper Clause means anything it means you can do things that
you believe are absolutely necessary.
But even if a national bank was absolutely necessary for a
commercial nation, still I can not help but hope that Marshall
would have been horrified to see Professor Snowiss use McCulloch
as an indirect way of suggesting that it's alright for the Supreme
Court to textualize a prohibition on anti-abortion legislation," or
as a basis for much
of the civil rights jurisprudence of the late
6
twentieth century.'
More intriguingly, Professor Snowiss suggests that the fast
and loose jurisprudence she believes that McCulloch exemplifies
was also that of the second Justice Harlan, as demonstrated in his
dissent in Poe v. Ullman 7 and his concurring opinion in
Griswold," and Harlan's brand of constitutional adjudication is

11. See generally Snowiss, supra note 4.
12. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1817).
13. DOUGLAS W. KMIEC & STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORY, CASES, AND PHILOSOPHY (1999).
14. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 351, 419 (1996) (telling of
Madison's recollection that the Philadelphia Convention had rejected a general
incorporation proposal for the federal government, and of the recollection of
other framers that a proposal granting the specific power to incorporate a

national bank had been rejected as well).
15. Snowiss, supra note 4, at 995-97.
16. Id. at 993-94.
17. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522-555 (1961).
18. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-507 (1965).
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also what the plurality was doing in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey. 9 Indeed, at the end of her paper, Professor Snowiss gives a
ringing endorsement to Justice Harlan, and to the notion of
"substantive due process" as employed by the plurality in Casey.
She goes so far as to declare that the Court has now accepted the
legitimacy of substantive due process."
I am not so sure about that. I think the Supreme Court's
rejection of a "right to die" which was purportedly grounded in
substantive due process, indicates some hesitation over the
concept.21 In any event, whatever the views of a plurality or
majority of the current Supreme Court, I have not accepted
substantive due process. I think Casey is flat-out wrong. I've done
a book length rant on this," but suffice it to say here that Michael
Paulsen and Daniel Rosen got it right when they suggested that, if
the rationale of Casey is correct, that stare decisis demands we
follow the admittedly dubious established precedent of Roe v.
Wade, then Brown should never have overruled Plessy," but I
digress.
Professor Snowiss makes a neat, brief acknowledgment that
there are those out there who hold views that are critical of the
"living constitution" jurisprudence she advocates, and there is a
nod of sorts in the direction of Justice Scalia.24 However, Professor
Snowiss hints that Scalia is not to be taken seriously because he
acknowledged that his First Amendment opinions are not
grounded in original understanding, 5 and rely on stare decisis
really (although Professor Snowiss did not say this explicitly) to
the same extent as Casey does. She has a point, but even Homer
nodded occasionally, and if Scalia got it wrong in the First
Amendment area, it does not mean he is wrong when he talks
about the illegitimacy of Roe, 6 Casey, or even Lee v. Weisman."
19. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
20. Snowiss, supra note 4, at 995-96.
21. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (telling of the
United States Supreme Court's refusal to extend the substantive due process
rationale of Casey to enforce a "right to die"); See also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793 (1997).
22. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION: RACE,
RELIGION,

AND ABORTION RECONSIDERED (1994) (arguing that original

understanding is a jurisprudential philosophy vastly preferable to the kind of
"living constitution" jurisprudence of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.

833 (1992)).
23. See Michael Stokes Paulsen & Daniel N. Rosen, Brown, Casey-Style:
The Shocking First Draft of the Segregation Opinion, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1287

(1994) (purportedly reporting the discovery of a previously lost draft opinion
in Brown v. Board. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which would have
reaffirmed Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
24. Snowiss, supra note 4, at 989.

25. Id.
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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I also wonder whether it makes sense to take Harlan's weird
behavior in Poe and Griswold as somehow tied in with his general
philosophy of judicial restraint. I think the Harlan
who believed29
28
that the Warren Court got it wrong in Miranda, Mapp v. Ohio,
Reynolds v. Sims" and Baker v. Carr,3 is the real Harlan. That

Harlan would dissent from Professor Snowiss' invocation of him as
a guide for the innovative constitutional jurisprudence she
advocates. "The Constitution is not a panacea for every blot upon
the public welfare," Harlan said, "nor should this Court, ordained
as a judicial body, be thought of as a general haven for reform
movements."32
But let us move to another level. Professor Snowiss raises a
crucial problem when she wonders whether we should really apply
the "doubtful case" rule, and limit judicial nullification of statutes
to those that clearly violate the Constitution." She seems to
suggest that such a case would never actually occur, because the
Court would be too weak really to combat a political branch bent
on ignoring the Constitution. Somehow, for Professor Snowiss,
that serves as justification for giving the Court authority to nullify
legislation in cases which do not meet the strictures of the
"doubtful case" rule, but precisely how eludes me. However, can
the Court really resist clearly unconstitutional acts? How did the
framers deal with this anticipated difficulty?
Who was supposed to see that judicial determinations of
unconstitutionality were implemented? This was the most daring
suggestion in The Federalist. That is what the checks and
balances were all about, that's what the impeachment provisions
were supposed to be about, and that is what all that talk about
integrity and virtue necessary for republican government was
concerned with. I think the framers actually trusted the American
people to elect officials noted for virtue and integrity, at least for
the Senate and for the Presidency.34 Their virtue and integrity
were presumably to be enlisted in the service of the rule of law,
and in support of determinations by the Supreme Court.
27. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting). See
generally ANTONIN SCALIA, 'A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 41-47 (1997)

(giving a recent limning of Justice Scalia's objection to these and other
Supreme Court exercises which abandon the original understanding).
28. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 524 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

29. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 686 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 330-349 (1962) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
32. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 624-25.

33. Snowiss, supra note 4, at 964-70.
34. See, e.g. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay) (arguing, with regard to the
Senate and President, that the Constitutionally-specified selection procedure
was supposed to result in the election of "those men only who have become the
most distinguished by their abilities and virtue ...).
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But if this was what they believed, the Seventeenth
Amendment 35 and the development of political parties have all but
eliminated the idea of disinterested virtue in our public officials.
All you need to do is look at the sorry reception those of us who
believed that virtue and honor were questions important to
resolving impeachment charges received in the Senate about a
year ago.6 Time and taste do not permit me to talk about the
ludicrous idea of looking for virtue in the current incumbent of the
oval office.
But if the essential reinforcing mechanism of virtue in the
Legislature and the Executive is no longer there, and it is not, does
that mean that the kind of constitutional jurisprudence Professor
Snowiss advocates is the only answer? Forgotten in all of this is
the method of constitutional change proposed by the framers. It is
the Article V amendment procedure. 7 If the Constitution is to be
changed, I say let the people do it, not the courts, lest we lose any
pretensions at all to republican government.
Let me end by considering Bob Novak's recent column in the
Chicago Sun Times.3 8 Novak claimed that Scalia has taken the
position that there are only two Justices who really care about the
Constitution any more, him and Clarence Thomas.39 They are the
only two, according to this view, who still believe in interpretation
according to original understanding."' Also, according to Novak,
Scalia has said that if Al Gore is elected, he will resign, because
Gore will only pack the Court with more living constitution types.4'
Now many in the legal academy might well look at the prospect of
a Scalia resignation and think: "I'd been wavering, but now I have
a reason to vote for Al Gore," but I hope they'll hesitate: Because
if we hold with Marshall that "we must never forget that it is a
[C]onstitution we are expounding,"' that Constitution has to have
some fixed meaning, and the arguments in Marbury and The

35. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XVII (providing for the popular election of
Senators, and replacing the old method of selection by state legislatures).
36. Stephen B. Presser, Would George Washington Have Wanted Bill
Clinton Impeached?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 666 (1999) (making the case for
impeachment as a device to promote virtue and honor on the part of federal
officials, at least in the case of President Clinton). This article contains an
edited version of testimony given before the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on the Constitution. The comment in the text about the "sorry
reception" of this view flows from the Senate's rejection of the House's
recommendation of removal of the President.
37. U.S. CONST. art. V.
38. Robert Novak, Scalia Hints He'll Quit High Court if Gore Wins, THE

CHICAGO SUN TIMES, April 2, 2000, at 32.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat (17 U.S.) 316, 407 (1819).
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FederalistNo. 78 make no sense unless this is true." McCulloch
makes me nervous, but even if the result in that case was wrong,
the statement on judicial review in Marbury, though not original,
was correct, and I am going to vote for Bush, hoping Scalia stays
on the Court.

43. This is because those arguments, especially in FEDERALIST NO. 78,
accept the notion that the judiciary exercises only judgment, not will, and is
only implementing the will of the people, acting as the people's agents. For
this to be true, the directions of the principal have to be clear, singular in
meaning, and understandable by the agents. See generally THE FEDERALIST
No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).

